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Compendium
An Outline of 23 California Common
Law Business Torts
PETER R.J. THOMPSON*
INTRODUCTION
This compendium outlines the elements and some litigation consid-
erations of twenty three business torts currently cognizable under the
common law of California.' The intent of the author is to provide the
business lawyer or litigator with a check list which may be valuable in
analyzing a fact situation to determine which causes of action should
be pleaded. The torts are discussed in alphabetical order for conven-
ience of the reader and because no topical groupings are entirely satis-
factory. This outline is not intended to be exhaustive: the prima facie
elements of every tort are discussed, but defenses, damages and litiga-
tion considerations are mentioned only when an interesting recent
trend has emerged. The material on punitive damages which is con-
Mr. Thompson is associated with the law firm of Sullivan, Jones & Archer in San Diego,
California. Member, State Bar of California. J.D., University of San Diego School of Law 1979
(cum laude); co-author of Acreage, Residency and Excess-Land Sale" Striking A Balance Between
Modem Agriculture and Historic Water Policy, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 887 (1978).
1. A cause of action for prima facie tort has not yet been recognized in California. How-
ever, the rationale of prima faie tort has been used in the analysis of other torts, for instance,
intentional interference with the right to pursue a lawful calling. See Diaz v. Kay-Dix Ranch, 9
Cal. App. 3d 588, 592 n.3, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445 n.3 (1970).
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tained in the section on the tort of fraud is generally applicable to all
tort causes of action, except where expressly limited as noted.
1. Abuse of Process
2. Civil Conspiracy
3. Conspiracy to Induce Breach of Contract
4. Constructive Eviction
5. Conversion
6. Fraud
7. Inducing Breach of Contract (Tortious Interference With Con-
tract)
8. Interference with Employment Relationship
9. Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
10. Invasion of Privacy
11. Intentional Interference with the Right to Pursue a Lawful
Business
12. Malicious Prosecution
13. Misappropriation of Trade Secret
14. Negligence
15. Negligent Misrepresentation
16. Nuisance
17. Plagiarism (Copyright Infringement)
18. Products Liability
19. Slander of Title (Injurious Falsehood or Disparagement)
20. Trade Libel
21. Trademark Infringement
22. Tradename Infringement
23. Unfair Competition
1. Abuse of Process
Abuse of Process is defined as the use of "legal process, whether
criminal or civil, against another to accomplish a purpose for which it
is not designed."2 "Process" includes, but is not limited to, execution,
injunction, summons, notice of taking a deposition, discovery, and ex-
cessive or wrongful attachment. Additionally, statutory liability for
wrongful attachment has existed since 1977.3
The liability phase involves two elements. The first element is a will-
ful act in use of process which is not proper in the regular conduct of
the proceeding.' The second element is ulterior purpose. While malice
2. Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 300, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580 (1971). See also
Seidner v. 1551 Greenfield Owners Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 3d 895, 903, 166 Cal. Rptr. 803, 807
(1980).
3. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §490.010.
4. Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 69 Cal. 2d 461, 466, 446 P.2d 152, 155,
72 Cal. Rptr. 344, 347 (1969).
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or harassment as an ulterior purpose may be inferable from an im-
proper act, malice alone without an intentional misuse of the judicial
process to obtain an unjustifiable collateral advantage is not actiona-
ble.' Therefore, the key to, establishing liability under this tort is not
the subjective state of mind of the defendant but rather is proof of the
collateral advantage sought.
Younger v. Solomon6 and Weisenberg v. Molina7 illustrate improper
collateral advantage. In Younger, the defendant served interrogatories
with an attached confidential letter to the California State Bar. The
letter asked for responses to charges of unethical conduct by an attor-
ney. These interrogatories constituted abuse of process because the
purpose of the suit was to publicize the confidential letter in order to
damage the attorney's reputatkrn 8 In Weisenberg, the judgment debtor
and another conspired to enter a false judgment, and execute on assets
pursuant thereto, for the purpose of hindering collection by a prior
judgment creditor.9
While it has been stated that the taking of an appeal might in some
instances be an abuse of process,10 that result is unlikely because, even
if frivolous or malicious, an appeal almost always has the additional
and proper purpose of reversing a lower ruling."
2. Civil Conspiracy
The prima facie case for civil conspiracy requires three elements: (1)
the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) the wrongful act or
acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting from such act
or acts. 1
2
The wrongful acts may be any civil wrong; for instance, fraud 3 or
inducing breach of contract.'4 A key ligitation consideration is the
availability of joint and several liability.' 5
5. Id
6. 38 Cal. App. 3d 289, 113 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974).
7. 58 Cal. App. 3d 478, 129 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1976).
8. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 297-98, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19.
9. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 489, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
10. Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n of Oakland, Inc., 7 Cal. 3d 94, 104 n.4, 496 P.2d
817, 824 n.4, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 n.4 (1972).
11. See Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines, 198 Cal. App. 2d 611, 615, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919,
922 (1961).
12. See Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 64, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 660 (1963),
citing Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 677, 262 P. 302, 303 (1927).
13. See 202 Cal. at 676, 262 P. at 302.
14. 223 Cal. App. 2d at 65, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
15. 202 Cal. at 677-78, 262 P. at 303.
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3. Conspiracy to Induce Breach of Contract
This tort is a species of the tort of civil conspiracy. Four elements are
involved: (1) conspiracy; (2) wrongful inducement or procurement of
breach of contract; (3) causation; and (4) actual damages.' 6
From the plaintiffs perspective, one advantage of this tort over tor-
tious interference with contract is that a tort action as well as a breach
of contract action will lie against a party to the contract who was a
member of the conspiracy, 7 thus allowing punitive damages against
that party.
A corporate agent, acting on behalf of the corporation, however, can-
not be joined with a corporate defendant as a co-conspirator.' 8
4. Constructive Eviction
The elements of constructive eviction, as recently stated in the case of
Stoiber v. Honeychuck,"9 are: (1) landlord commits or omits an act or
acts which (2) render the premises or a substantial portion thereof unfit
for the purposes for which they were leased.20
Because constructive eviction is not a contract action, punitive dam-
ages are available for a wrongful eviction obtained with the use of op-
pression, fraud, or malice.21 A wrongfully evicted tenant may recover
damages for mental anguish and pain.'
5. Conversion
The elements of an action for conversion are: (1) plaintiff's owner-
ship or immediate right to possession of personal property; (2) defend-
ant's wrongful act or disposition of plaintiffs property; (3) defendant's
intent to exercise dominion over plaintiffs property; and (4) proxi-
mately caused damages.'
a. Definition of "Personal Property"
Included in the definition of personal property for the purposes of
conversion are choses in action represented by documents such as
bonds, notes, bills of exchange, stock certificates or warehouse receipts.
Even when the plaintiff does not have actual possession of the certifi-
16. See 223 Cal. App. 2d at 64, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
17. Id at 72, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
18. Id at 72-73, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
19. 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980).
20. Id at 925-26, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 205.
21. Corwin v. Hamilton, 154 Cal. App. 2d 829, 833, 317 P.2d 139, 141-42 (1957).
22. See Tooke v. Allen, 85 Cal. App. 2d 230, 239, 192 P.2d 804, 810 (1948).
23. See Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 393,410, 145 Cal. Rptr. 406,
416 (1978); Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 549, 176 P.2d 1, 6 (1946).
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cate, a stock share is subject to conversion.24 But, unreified intangibles
such as good will generally are not considered personal property.25
However, their improper appropriation may be actionable in equity
under the torts of unfair competition or misappropriation of trade
secrets. Although tradenames are classified as personal property for
the purpose of transfering ownership,26 it is unlikely that a court would
allow a cause of action for conversion of a tradename. The reason is
that adequate remedies exist in the forms of unfair competition and
statutory tradename infringement.2
Money can be the subject of conversion only if it is a specifically
identifiable fund or corpus, although the actual bills need not be
earmarked.2" However, the plaintiff must establish not merely that the
defendant owes him money but that plaintiff has the right of immediate
possession2 9 by virtue of the fact that the defendant was plaintiff's
agent with respect to that sum. 30 A plaintiff also has an immediate
right to possess where he or ,he has a lien on the money in defendant's
hands.3'
The element of "wrongful act or disposition" requires an actual in-
terference such as taking, destruction, alteration, transfer, use, with-
holding, misdelivery or failure to return.32 Interference not amounting
to dispossession is not conversion, but may be actionable as a trespass
to chattel.
b. Remedies for Conversion
Remedies for conversion include: (1) specific recovery of the prop-
erty3 3 plus damages for loss of use; (2) damages based on the value of
the property based on a theory of forced sale; (3) or quasi-contractual
restitution based on unjust enrichment when plaintiffs conduct has
waived recovery for the tort.34
24. See Mears v. Crocker National Bank, 84 Cal. App. 2d 637, 644, 191 P.2d 501, 505 (1948).
25. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §655; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §1420.
26. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§14400, 14401.
27. See text accompanying notes.210-225 infra.
28. Haigler v. Donnelly, 18 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 117 P.2d 331, 335 (1941); Weiss v. Marcus, 51
Cal. App. 3d 590, 599, 124 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 (1975); Baxter v. King, 81 Cal. App. 192, 194,253 P.
172, 172 (1927).
29. See Herman v. Blackman, 142 Cal. App. 2d 613, 617, 298 P.2d 649, 651 (1956); Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co. v. San Francisco Bank, 58 Cal. App. 2d 528, 534, 136 P.2d 853, 856 (1943); 81
Cal. App. at 194, 253 P.2d at 172-73 (1927).
30. See 18 Cal. 2d at 681, 117 P.2d at 335; Kelly v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d 211, 217-18,
306 P.2d 955, 959-60 (1957).
31. See 51 Cal. App. 3d at 598, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
32. See generally Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 918, 523 P.2d 662, 668,
114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 628 (1974).
33. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE §3379. See Paterson v. Sherman, 68 Cal. App. 2d 706, 711, 157
P.2d 863, 866 (1945).
34. See Shahood v. Cavin, 154 Cal. App. 2d 745, 748, 316 P.2d 700, 702 (1957).
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General damages for conversion consist of a sum to compensate for
the interference with possession or the right to possession. Punitive
damages are available for conversion upon a showing of oppression,
fraud, or malice.35 The emerging law is that "malice in fact" may be
shown by showing "callous disregard of plaintiffs rights. 36
6 Fraud
a. Pnma Facie Case Elements
As set out in Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League,37 the liability
case for common law fraud involves five elements. The first element is
a false representation of material fact. A "false representation" in-
cludes an affirmative misrepresentation, non-disclosure, and conceal-
ment when defendant has a fiduciary duty or exclusive knowledge.3
The false representation must relate to a matter of existing or past
fact, not merely an expression of intention to act in the future or an
expression of a promise.39 As the court held in Church of the Merciful
Savior v. Volunteers ofAmerica, Inc. I
[a] declaration of intention, although in the nature of a promise,
made in good faith, without intention to deceive, and in the honest
expectation that it will be fulfilled, even though it is not carried out,
does not constitute a fraud.41
However, a promise is actionable as fraud if the promisor had no inten-
tion of performing the promised action.4' The plaintiff carries the bur-
den of proving that the defendant had no intention of performing the
promise.43 Whether the defendant intended to perform is a question of
fact to be determined from all of the circumstances. 44 The cases are
divided on the question whether nonperformance by itself is sufficient
to sustain a finding that the defendant did not intend to perform. 5
The second element requires that the false representation be made
with knowledge of its falsity, recklessly, or without reasonable ground
for believing its truth.
35. 11 Cal. 3d at 922, 523 P.2d at 671, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 631 (1974).
36. See generally Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 351-53, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226,
233-34 (1970).
37. 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975).
38. See id at 374, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 738. See also Younan v. Equitax, Inc., I ll Cal. App. 3d
498, 512, - Cal. Rptr. - (1980).
39. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Service, 106 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 370, 372 (1980); Daniels v. Oldenburg, 100 Cal. App. 2d 724, 727, 224 P.2d 472, 474 (1950).
40. 184 Cal. App. 2d 851, 8 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1960).
41. Id at 859, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
42. Id
43. See id
44. People v. Christenberry, 167 Cal. App. 2d 751, 755, 334 P.2d 978, 981 (1959).
45. See 184 Cal. App. 2d at 860, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (containing cases on both positions).
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The third element is intent to induce reliance.4 6 Intent to deceive
traditionally is not required as long as plaintiff proves intent to induce
reliance.47 However, in Sun In Sand, Inc. v. United Caifornia Bank,48
the California Supreme Court held that "[ain action for fraudulent mis-
representation lies only when the defendant is charged with knowledge
of falsity and an intent to deceive.""
Justifiable reliance is the fourth essential element of a claim for
fraud.50 As with all elements of the prima facie case, "the burden of
proving this reliance is upon the party claiming fraud."51 Reliance is
not justifiable where it is "demonstrated to be unreasonable in light of
plaintiff's intelligence and experience."5 2 Also, reliance is unjustifiable
if the plaintiff made an independent investigation of the subject matter
of the defendant's representation and the plaintiffs decision to enter
into the transaction was based on that independent investigation. 3
b. General Damages
General damages for fraud are not extended to those which were
caused by plaintiffs "foreseeable reliance," but instead are restricted to
those "flowing from" the action defendant intended to induce.54
The usual measure of fraud damages is "out-of-pocket" loss.5 How-
ever, in a "secret profits" type of action where the usual tort measure of
damages would be inadequate because plaintiff suffered no actual out-
of-pocket loss, and where a breach of contract between parties in an
agency, fiduciary, confidentiality, or broker-buyer relationship has ele-
ments of fraud and deceit, the court may treat the fraudulent breach as
unjust enrichment under quasi-contract.56 In Ward v. Taggert, a real
estate broker fraudulently purported to act for a named seller, but in-
stead used the buyer's money to purchase the property himself and re-
sell to the buyer at a higher price. The broker was deemed by the court
to be an involuntary trustee of the secret profit.5 7 Such treatment
avoids the "out-of-pocket loss" tort damage restriction by allowing re-
46. See Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 374, 122 Cal. Rptr.
732, 738 (1975).
47. Id
48. 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
49. Id at 703, 582 P.2d at 942, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 351 (emphasis added).
50. See Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 36, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522 (1980); 49 Cal.
App. 3d at 374, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
51. Elkind v. Woodward, 152 Cal. App. 2d 170, 175, 313 P.2d 66, 68 (1957).
52. Wagner v. Venson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 36, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516, 522 (1980).
53. See Carlson v. Brickman, 110 Cal. App. 2d 237, 245-46, 242 P.2d 94, 98-99 (1952).
54. See Carlson v. Murphy, 8 Cal. App. 2d 607, 611-12, 47 P.2d 1100, 1102-03 (1935).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE §3343.
56. See Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 741-42, 336 P.2d 534, 537-38 (1959).
57. Id at 736, 336 P.2d at 534.
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covery to the degree of unjust enrichment. Furthermore, by treating
the action as one in quasi-contract rather than in contract, the court
avoids the prohibition against punitive damages in contract contained
in California Civil Code Section 3294.8
The 1975 Book of Approved Jury Instructions No. 12.57 and the ac-
companying note provide for a so-called "benefit-of-the-bargain"
measure of damages in an appropriate Ward-type case.5 9 However,
Judge Hopper of the Fifth District has pointed out that it is incorrect to
designate the Ward "unjust-enrichment" rule as a benefit-of-the-bar-
gain rule, and that the correct non-contract measure of damages is cur-
rently in hopeless confusion.6°
c. Punitive Damages
Under California law, exemplary damages (sometimes called "puni-
five" damages) are recoverable for fraud pursuant to California Civil
Code Section 3294, which states:
In an action for breich of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages,
may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punish-
ing the defendant.61
58. Id at 742, 336 P.2d at 538.
59. Pepper v. Underwood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 707 & n.8, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343, 350 & n.8
(1975). CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL (BAJI) No. 12.57 (5th ed. 1975).
60. See Overgard v. Johnson, 68 CaL App. 3d 821, 823, 137 Cal. Rptr. 412, 413 (1977).
61. CAL. Civ. CODE §3294, Because the words "oppression, fraud, or malice" in Civil Code
Section 3294 are in the disjunctive,fraudalone, without oppression or malice, is an adequate basis
for awarding punitive damages in California. Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 3d
982, 996, 149 Cal. Rptr. 119, 126 (1978) (quoting Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Marina
View Heights Dev. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 101, 135-36, 135 Cal. Rptr. 802, 822 (1977).
Oppression was defined in Richardson . Employers Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd, as "subject-
ing a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of his rights." Richardson v.
Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 246, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556
(1972). In Richardson, oppression was proved when an insurance company forced an insured's
claim into arbitration even though it knew that the claim was completely valid. 25 Cal. App. 3d at
24546, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 556. In Roth Y. Shell Oil Co., oppression was proved when defendant
Shell Oil Co. removed from a dealer's premises the Shell sign and pole, painted out the Shell
colors on the pumps and building, and discontinued service to the dealer without inquiring
whether the dealer had committed acts sufficient to justify termination of the Shell dealership.
Roth v. Shell Oil Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 676, 683, 8 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (1960).
As used in Civil Code Section 3294, malice means 'malice in fact," not malice implied by law.
Simmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 341, 368, 133 Cal. Rptr. 42, 58 (1976).
Evil motive is the central element of malice in fact. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 806, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 492 (1977). In O'Hara, the plaintiff had been raped in her
apartment The apartment building was operated by defendants. The trial court sustained a de-
murrer to her complaint for fraud and deceit which prayed for actual and punitive damages. The
appellate court reversed, finding that the facts alleged could support an award of punitive dam-
ages. The court found "malice" in the form of "conscious disregard for safety" where the opera-
tors "knowingly misrepresented the safety and security of the complex with the intent to induce
appellant to rent an apartment" Id at 801-02, 142 CaL Rptr. at 48992.
Because the statute refers to "malice, express or implied," malice does not require proof of
animosity or ill wilL The case of Schroeder .Au'o Driveway Co., has included within malice
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Because the statute employs the word "may," the decisions whether
to award punitive damages, as well as how much to award, are within
the discretion of the trier of fact.62 In other words, a plaintiff is never
"entitled" to punitive damages. Consequently, "abuse of discretion re-
sulting from passion and prejudice" is the standard used for reviewing
the amount of punitive damages awarded. 3 The standard for review-
ing the factual determination that oppression, fraud or malice exists is
the "familiar substantial evidence test.""
d Punitive Damages/or Concealment-type Fraud
Punitive damages for fraud are not limited to cases of affirmative
misrepresentations. In at least four cases in California, punitive dam-
ages have been awarded for concealment-type fraud. In Hobart v. Ho-
bart Estate Co. ,6 exemplary damages were awarded against defendant
Greene who, as president of the corporation, fraudulently omitted to
tell plaintiff stockholder certain facts affecting the value of stock which
plaintiff sold at depressed prices to a guardianship estate over which
Greene was a guardian with the right to vote the stock.66 In Black v.
Shearson, Hammill & Co. ,67 punitive damages were awarded where a
stockbroker, who owed a fiduciary duty to his customers, concealed
from his customers adverse facts about stocks he sold to them. 8 In
McDaniel v. McDaniel,69 punitive damages were awarded against an
ex-husband for fraudulent concealment during settlement neogitations
in divorce proceedings70 of the existence of additional assets and,
finally, in Werschkull v. United California Bank,7 the appellate court
upheld an award of punitive damages for concealment-type fraud.
"defendant's callous disregard of plaintiffs rights or acting with knowledge that defendant's con-
duct was substantially certain to vex, annoy and injure plaintiff." Schroeder v. Auto Driveway
Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 666-67, 671, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 626-27, 631 (1974). In
Schroeder, the court found "malice in fact" where the defendant common carrier falsely assured
the plaintiffs that it was authorized under an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission
to transport plaintiffs goods. Id at 915, 922, 523 P.2d at 662, 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 627, 631. In
an action against an insurance company for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the court held that the claims representatives acted maliciously, and with the intent to
oppress, where they, inter alia, inadequately investigated the plaintiffs claim, and called the plain-
tiff a fraud. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 822, 598 P.2d 452, 458, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 488 (1979).
62. 24 Cal. 3d at 821 & n.2, 598 P.2d at 458 & n.2, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 488 & n.2.
63. Id at 824, 598 P.2d at 460, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
64. Id at 821, 598 P.2d at 458, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
65. 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945).
66. Id at 421-22, 159 P.2d at 962-64.
67. 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1969).
68. Id at 369, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
69. 275 Cal. App. 2d 927, 80 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1969).
70. Id at 940-44, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 845-48.
71. 85 Cal. App. 3d 981, 149 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1978).
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UCB was the trustee of its employee pension plan and, as such,
breached a duty to disclose to the beneficiaries any material changes in
the plan when it concealed from plaintiff employees the facts that it had
amended the plan and had diverted funds.72
e. Punitive Damages Without General Damages
It is sometimes stated that punitive damages cannot be awarded if no
actual or compensatory damages are awarded.73 Indeed, California
Civil Code Section 3294 may be interpreted to support this view since it
provides that "the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may re-
cover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the
defendants. 74 However, the correct rule is simply that the plaintiff
must have been actually damaged by the defendant's tortious act. In
Brewer v. Second Baptist Church ,'7 the court held that punitive dam-
ages are mere incidents of tort causes of action, and therefore punitive
damages cannot be awarded unless a tort was committed.76 In Topanga
Corp. v. Gentile,77 the court said that in an action for cancellation of
shares, for rescission or reformation of share interests and for punitive
damages,
[t]he fact that plaintiffs were not given a grant of monetary damages
of a certain amount is not determinative [of the issue of punitive
damages]. Plaintiff, was indeed damaged by defendants' fraud for de-
fendants had, as the result of the fraud, received stock in an amount
not commensurate with the value of their contribution to the corpo-
78ration.
In addition to the above-cited authority for the general proposition
that punitive damages require thefact of damage but not an award of
compensatory money damages, at least two California cases have spe-
cifically held that punitive damages are available in a fraud action
where the remedy obtained is rescission. In Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet
Motors,79 the court stated that "[d]efendant asserts that since plaintiff
elected to rescind the transaction, rather than affirm it and sue for dam-
ages, plaintiff may not have exemplary or punitive damages ....
Fraud alone is an adequate ground for awarding punitive damages [ci-
72. Id at 1004, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
73. See Birch Ranch & Oil Co. v. Campbell, 43 Cal. App. 2d 624, 628, 111 P.2d 445, 447
(1941).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE §3294 (emphasis added).
75. 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948). Brewer was followed in Esparza v. Specht, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 6, 127 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (1976).
76. 32 Cal. 2d at 801-02, 197 P.2d at 720.
77. 249 Cal. App. 2d 681, 58 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1967).
78. Id at 691, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
79. 270 Cal. App. 2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1969).
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tations omitted] and it is immaterial that plaintiffs recovery is in the
form of specific restitution, rather than monetary damages."80 In
Mahon v. Berg,81 the court found that "[t]he broad equity powers in-
yoked in an action for rescission because of fraud should afford such a
remedy [punitive damages]."8
A related but apparently unsolved question is whether punitive dam-
ages for fraud can be recovered when the remedy sought is declarative
in nature. Declaratory relief is classified as an equitable remedy,83 and
equity generally does not award punitive damages.84 But the court, in
Mahon v. Berg,85 stated that "[h]ere . . . some deterrent to fraud is
equitable and reasonable. It is not afforded if the wrongdoer risks only
the fruits of his fraud."86 Although its language is interesting, Mahon
involved the remedy of rescission, not declaratory relief. The granting
of declaratory relief is premised not on the finding of actual damage, as
is rescission, but rather is premised on an "actual controversy" as to the
rights of the parties. In contrast, as outlined above, recovery of puni-
tive damages requires proof of actual damages.
The law is equally unclear on the issue of whether punitive damages
are recoverable if the plaintiff obtains an injunction but no actual dam-
ages. On the one hand, injunctive relief is the classic equitable remedy
and equity generally does not award punitive damages.8 7 On the other
hand, the policy behind punitive damage awards, as stated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Com-
pany,88 is to punish wrongdoers and thus deter the commission of
objectionable or wrongful acts. 89 If the plaintiff proves that the defend-
ant committed a wrongful act constituting fraud, and that the plaintiff
was actually damaged therefrom, there is no reason in principle why
the policy enunciated in Egan should not apply to allow recovery of
punitive damages as well as injunctive relief.
f. The Trend Toward Limiting Punitive Damages
No discussion of punitive damages for business torts would be com-
plete without noting the decided trend toward limiting punitive dam-
ages or eliminating them all together. Since January 1, 1981, courts
80. Id at 484, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
81. 267 Cal. App. 2d 588, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968).
82. Id at 590, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
83. Dills v. Delira Corp., 145 Cal. App. 2d 124, 129, 302 P.2d 397, 400 (1956).
84. Rivero v. Thomas, 86 Cal. App. 2d 225, 239, 194 P.2d 533, 542 (1948).
85. 267 Cal. App. 2d 588, 73 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1968).
86. Id at 590, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
87. 86 Cal. App. 2d at 239, 194 P.2d at 542.
88. 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979).
89. Id at 825, 598 P.2d at 461, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
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have had discretion to prohibit, upon a showing of good cause, proof at
trial of defendant's financial condition on the issue of punitive damages
until the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing on liability for puni-
tives.9° In addition, the plaintiff is no longer permitted to even discover
the defendant's financial condition pursuant to a claim for punitive
damages unless so ordered by the court at the conclusion of a hearing
to determine whether there is a "substantial probability" that the plain-
tiff will prevail on the claim for punitive damages. 9'
Judge Elkington of the First District Court of Appeal has stated that
"the law of punitive damages as it has developed in this state no longer
serves any public purpose, or the legitimate interests of the unentitled
recipients of its constantly accelerating largess."92 Judge Wiener of the
Fourth District, sitting as a judge of the Superior Court in San Diego,
has quoted Judge Elkington with apparent sympathy.93
7 Inducing Breach of Contract Also Known as Tortious Interference
with Contract94
Modem courts classify this tort as a species of interference with pro-
spective economic advantage, although inducing breach of contract was
historically prior.
Six elements are required:95 (1) A valid existing contract; (2) that
defendant had knowledge of; (3) defendant intended to induce breach;
(4) contract in fact breached, or performance rendered more difficult;96
(5) causation; and (6) actual damage.
A party to the contract cannot be a defendant in a suit for tortious
interference with contract.97 However, if a party to the contract con-
spired with another to breach the contract, the aggrieved party to the
contract may sue all conspirators, including the wrongdoing party, for
conspiracy to induce breach of contract.
Justification or privilege are defenses to the tort of inducing breach
of contract.98
90. CAL. CiV. CODE §3295(a).
91. Id §3295(b).
92. Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 758, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 248
(1980) (Elkington, J., concurring).
93. Baker v. Sequoia Ins. Co., No. 359221, slip op. at 3 (super. Ct. San Diego).
94. See Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 994, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723
(1977).
95. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
96. Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 232, 359 P.2d 465, 469, 11
Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1961).
97. See 65 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
98. Agostini v. Strycula, 231 Cal. App. 2d 804, 809,42 Cal. Rptr. 314, 317 (1965) (statements
made in the course of official proceeding are privileged and therefore cannot form the basis of an
action for inducing breach of contract).
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At present, negligent inducement of breach of contract is not actiona-
ble in tort.9 9 The only qualification to this general rule is the tort of
interference with employment relationship, where an employer may
maintain a tort action in negligence to recover for loss of employee
services.100 However, Judge Friedman of the Third District Court of
Appeal has argued, quite logically, for recovery when the act is negli-
gent, using the test for tort recovery based on "reasonable foreseeability
of loss."''° The California Supreme Court appears to be-ready to allow
a cause of action for negligent inducement of breach of contract on
general tort "foreseeability" principles.' 02
Compensatory damages may be measured by the capitalization of
prospective profits. 0 3 Punitive damages are awardable for inducing
breach of contract when oppression, fraud or malice is proven.°n
8. Interference with Employment Relationship
In Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,1°5 the California
Supreme Court indicated that it disfavors this tort as "archaic" and of
"minimal importance." Thus, in a conflict of laws context under com-
parative impairment analysis, it applied contrary Louisiana law pre-
cluding recovery. However, the Offshore court assumed for the
purpose of its analysis that California law grants a cause of action for
interference with employment relationship.
10 6
This tort has four elements. First, there must be an interference with
an employment relationship. The interference typically consists of a
personal injury to the plaintiff's employee.
Second, the interference must be intentional or negligent. In
Darmour Productions Corp. v. Baruch Corp. ,lO7 the court found a cause
of action for interference with employment relationship where a movie
producer sued the defendant for negligently injuring an actress engaged
in a current production. As a result of defendant's negligence, plaintiff
was deprived of the actress' services.
The third and fourth elements of interference with employment rela-
tionship are causation and damage.
99. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 636, 354 P.2d 1073, 1075, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379
(1960).
100. See notes 105-111 and accompanying text infra.
101. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d, 37, 45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216, 221
(1975).
102. See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 806-807 n.4, 598 P.2d 60, 65 n.4, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 407, 411-12 n.4 (1979).
103. Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 367, 136 P.2d 651, 658 (1943).
104. See CAL. CIV. CODE §3294(a).
105. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
106. Id at 168, 583 P.2d at 728-29, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
107. 135 Cal. App. 351, 353, 27 P.2d 664, 665 (1933).
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In California, this tort has a statutory basis. California Civil Code
Section 49(c) states that "the rights of personal relations forbid...
[a]ny injury to a servant which affects his ability to serve his master
.... ,108 This statute follows the ancient common law rule which re-
garded an injury to a servant as a violation of a property right of the
master to the services of his servants.10 9 According to modem defini-
tion as stated in Darmour, servant is synonymous with employee. 10
A partnership as a separate entity may not sue under this tort. Busi-
ness losses suffered by the partnership entity due to injury of one part-
ner are not recoverable by the partnership entity under this tort because
the injured partner may recover on his or her own behalf for the per-
sonal loss of earnings reflected by any diminution in his or her share of
the partnership income. By denying the partnership, as a separate en-
tity, the right to recover for loss of the partner's services, the courts
avoid double recovery for plaintiff's injuries.'
9. Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
a. Prima Facie Case Elements
According to the leading case of Buckaloo v. Johnson,112 this tort has
five elements: (1) economic relationship containing the probability of
future economic benefit; (2) knowledge by the defendant third party of
the existence of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent 1 3 acts on
the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual
disruption of the relationship; and (5) damages to the plaintiff proxi-
mately caused by the acts of the defendant.
b. Defense of Competitor's Privilege
California law recognizes a "competitor's privilege" to interfere,
even intentionally, with prospective contractual relations to obtain
business, so long as wrongful means are not used and the competitor's
"purpose is at least in part to advance his interest in competing."' 4
Moreover, the comment on subsection (1) of Section 768 of the Restate-
108. CAL. CwV. CODE §49(c).
109. See Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 636, 354 P.2d 1073, 1075, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377,
379 (1960).
110. 135 Cal. App. at 353, 27 P.2d at 665.
111. Sharfman v. California, 253 Cal. App. 2d 333, 337, 61 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269 (1967).
112. 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827, 357 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 (1975) (interference with
broker-seller relationship). See also Frazier v. Boccardo, 70 Cal. App. 3d 331, 338, 138 Cal. Rptr.
670, 673 (1977) (interference with attorney-client relationship).
113. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 808, 598 P.2d 60, 65, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 413
(1979).
114. Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 828, 357 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752
(1975); Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 21, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664, 670
(1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §768 (1979).
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ment Second of Torts concludes that a party's privilege to engage in
business and compete implies a privilege to induce customers to do
business with him instead of with his competitors. The extent of per-
missible competitive conduct was defined in Katz v. Kapper,1
5
Competition in business, though carried to the extent of ruining a
rival, is not ordinarily actionable, but every trader is left to conduct
his business in his own way, so long as the methods he employs do
not involve wrongful conduct such as fraud, misrepresentation, in-
timidation, coercion, obstruction, or molestation of the rival ... or
the procurement of the violation of contractual relations. If distur-
bance or loss comes as the result of competition, or the exercise of
like rights by others, as where a merchant undersells or oversells his
neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria. 16
The line between free competition and interference with prospective
economic advantage is not clearly drawn, but is determined on a case
by case basis. 11 Relevant criteria for this decision may be (1) the depth
of the economic relationship, and (2) whether the intentional disruption
was malicious or devious. 118
The common law tort of intentional unjustified interference with the
right to pursue a lawful calling 19 was interpreted in at least one Cali-
fornia case to be a species of interference with prospective economic
advantage.12 0 The practical significance of that classification is that
justification becomes an affirmative defense rather than a part of the
plaintiff's case"' and therefore may not be considered by the court
when ruling on a demurrer unless justification appears on the face of
the complaint.
c. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are available for this tort. In Guillory v. God-
frey, 22 the appellate court upheld an award of punitive damages under
a cause of action classified as "wrongful or malicious interference with
the formation of a contract . ., . 3 In Guillory, defendants owned a
115. 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935). Accord, Charles C. Chapman Bldg. Co. v. Califor-
nia Mart, 2 Cal. App. 3d 846, 857, 82 Cal. Rptr. 830, 837 (1969) (soliciting tenants to move to
competing building was privileged).
116. 7 Cal. App. 2d at 4, 44 P.2d at 1061.
117. See 2 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
118. 14 Cal. 3d at 828, 357 P.2d at 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 752 (1975) (defendant buyer, after
taking advantage of plaintiff broker's efforts, induced realty seller to accept lower price by exclud-
ing broker's commission. Court found cause of action because of devious dealing).
119. See Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n., 58 Cal. 2d 810, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 642 (1962).
120. See 79 Cal. App. 3d at 18, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 668.
121. Id
122. 134 CaL App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955).
123. Id at 630-31, 286 P.2d at 476.
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liquor store next door to plaintiffs cafe. When plaintiff hired a Negro
cook, defendants harassed plaintiff and plaintiffs customers, causing a
loss of business. The Guillory action appears to be identical to what is
now called interference with prospective economic advantage, or inten-
tional interference with a business expectancy, because plaintiff had an
expectancy of future cafe business which was knowingly and intention-
ally interfered with by the liquor store owner defendants, causing dam-
age to plaintiff. InAnthony v. Enzler,124 sellers of real property entered
into an option contract with the prospective buyersprior to the expira-
tion of an exclusive listing agreement with plaintiff broker. Both the
sellers and the buyers were liable for breach of the listing agreement,
and the buyers were additionally liable to the broker in punitive dam-
ages for intentional interference with prospective economic advan-
tage.125
10. Invasion of Privacy
Invasion of privacy is both a common law and statutory 26 tort in
California. At common law, the prima facie case for liability involves
four elements. The first element is an "invasion," which may consist of
eavesdropping, shadowing, trailing, wiretapping, electronic eavesdrop-
ping, the covert use of voice stress analyzer 2 7 or the commercial or
noncommercial use of one's name or picture. The second element re-
quires that the invasion be non-oral. 128
The third requirement is that the invasion be of the right to live an
ordinary, private life without subjection to unwarranted or undesired
publicity. News reports, however, are protected by the first amend-
ment. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 29 disclosure by a television
station of the name of a rape victim, obtained from public records, was
held to be protected by the first amendment and therefore not subject
to a suit for invasion of privacy. 30 The courts have also held that dis-
closure by a collection agency to a limited number of persons, for in-
stance one's employer, is not actionable as an invasion of privacy. 131
The fourth required element is that the invasion must have injured
124. 61 Cal. App. 3d 872, 132 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1976).
125. Id at 877-78, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
126. In 1971, the California legislature enacted a statutory damages action for invasion of
privacy, which made actionable the knowing commercial use of one's photo, name or likeness
ithout consent. CAL. CrV. CODE §3344.
127. CAL. PENAL CODE §637.3.
128. Grimes v. Carter, 241 Cal. App. 2d 694, 698, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 811 (1966).
129. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
130. Id at 496.
131. Timperley v. Chase Collection Service, 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 698-99, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782,
783 (1969).
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the plaintiffs feelings. Thus, the injury is not to reputation, as in defa-
mation, but is an injury to one's peace of mind.132
Invasion of privacy is not generally classified as a business tort be-
cause: (1) a business, as such, has no "feelings" which might be in-
jured, and (2) the defendant may be either a business entity or an
individual. However, there are certain types of businesses, for instance
collection agencies, the media and advertising which must be aware of
the invasion of privacy actions and the applicable defenses.
.1. Intentional lnte-/erence with the Right to Pursue a Lawful
Business
a. Prima Facie Case Elements
The three elements of plaintiffs prima facie case are: (1) an inten-
tional; (2) interference; with a (3) lawful business, calling, trade, or oc-
cupation. 133
b. The Defense of Justfcation
The recent case of Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Company, 134
stressed that justification is an affirmative defense to this tort, whereas
previous cases1 35 had not clearly so stated. The practical significance of
this is that justification may not be considered by the court when ruling
on a demurrer unless justification appears on the face of the com-
plaint. 36 Justification is determined "not by applying precise stan-
dards but by balancing, in light of all the circumstances, the respective
importance to society and the parties of protecting the activities in-
terferred with on the one hand and permitting the interference on the
other."'137
12. Malicious Prosecution
a. Prima Facie Case Elements
The case of Bertero v. National General Corp. ,138 set out the four ele-
ments of the prima facie case on liability: (1) favorable though not
necessarily "final" termination of a (2) prior separate proceeding (ei-
ther criminal, civil, or administrative), (3) prosecuted without probable
132. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 116, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 211 (1961).
133. See Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n., 58 Cal. 2d 806, 810, 376 P.2d 568, 570,
26 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 (1962); Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 18, 144
Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1978).
134. 79 Cal. App. 3d 13, 18, 144 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1978).
135. See 58 Cal. 2d at 810, 376 P.2d at 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (1962).
136. 79 Cal. App. 3d at 19, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (1978).
137. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 810, 376 P.2d 568, 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 (1962).
138. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974).
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cause, and (4) with malicious intent (ill will or improper purpose).139
Good faith reliance by a party on counsel, after full disclosure, con-
stitutes probable cause, and judgment against the present plaintiff, even
though reversed on appeal, is conclusive of probable cause.140
b. Damages
As damages you can recover your attorney's fees from the prior mali-
cious prosecution if the first judgment did not provide them.
As with all torts, punitive damages are available when oppression,
fraud or malice is proven. In Allard v. Church of Scientology,141 puni-
tive damages in a malicious prosecution lawsuit were authorized
against the employer-church where the founder and chief official of the
church, L. Ron Hubbard, initiated the "fair game policy" whereby
church "enemies. . .may be deprived of property or injured by any
means. . ".."141 InAllard, the "means" used was the filing of a lawsuit
for conversion without probable cause.
c. Recent Trends
In the past few years, California courts have established a number of
points in the area of malicious prosecution which are of interest to liti-
gators. A cause of action for malicious prosecution of a civil suit can
now be based on a cross-complaint asserted by your opponent in the
prior action. In Bertero v. National General Corp. ,143 the California
Supreme Court rejected arguments that a cross-complaint is not an "in-
itiation of civil proceeding" and that a cross-complaint is merely defen-
sive.144
The Bertero court also adopted both the subjective and the objective
("reasonable man") tests for determining whether there was probable
cause to institute the proceeding.1 45 Thus, liability may attach if either
test is met.
An important consideration in this area is that an attorney will be
liable for professional malpractice if he or she prosecutes a claim which
a reasonable lawyer would not regard as tenable or unreasonably ne-
glects to investigate the facts and the law."4
139. Id at 50, 529 P.2d at 613-14, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
140. See generaly Gause v. McClelland, 102 Cal. App. 2d 762, 763-65, 228 P.2d 91, 91-92
(1951).
141. 58 Cal. App. 3d 439, 443 n.1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 n.1 (1976).
142. Id
143. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 CaL Rptr. 184 (1974).
144. Id at 51-53, 529 P.2d at 614-15, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 190-92.
145. Id at 55, 529 P.2d at 617, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
146. Tool Research and Eng'r. Corp. v. H-enigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291
(1975).
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Two recent cases have clarified the question whether dismissals are
"favorable terminations" for purposes of a malicious prosecution suit.
In Minasion v. Sapse,14 7 the court ruled that a dismissal under Califor-
nia Code of Civil Procedure Section 583(a) for failure to prosecute is a
"favorable termination." On the other hand, in Lackner v. La Croix,
the court held that dismissal based on the statute of limitations does not
reflect on the merits of the cause of action and thus will not support a
subsequent suit for malicious prosecution. 148 The apparent distinction
between the cases is that Minasion involved a dismissal on substantive
grounds while Lackner was dismissed on procedural grounds. Such a
distinction should be irrelevant in determining whether a suit was
brought without probable cause. The key should be whether the prior
suit was without probable cause, without regard to whether the result
was "favorable" or "unfavorable" on procedural grounds.
13. Misappropriation of Trade Secret
a. Prima Facie Case Elements
The elements of the common law action for misappropriation of
trade secrets are set out in Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen .
The first element is the existence of a "trade secret." A trade secret is
defined as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives one a competitive ad-
vantage over one's competitors who do not know it or use it."15 Trade
secrets need not be so unique as to be patentable,' but the "competi-
tive advantage" element necessarily requires some uniqueness. Cus-
tomer lists, for example, may or may not- constitute trade secrets
depending on the extent of the prior business relationship and the em-
ployee's role in developing the list.15 2 By contrast, realty listings are
not considered trade secrets in California.
153
Second, there must be an appropriation through use, disclosure or
non-disclosure. No appropriation occurs when use of the secret is ob-
tained by means of "independent invention" or "reverse engineer-
147. 80 Cal. App. 3d 823, 145 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1978).
148. 25 Cal. 3d 747, 750, 602 P.2d 393, 394, 159 Cal. Rptr. 693, 694 (1979).
149. 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968).
150. Sinclair v. Aquarius Elec. Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 221, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654, 658 (1974).
151. Id. at 222, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 658. The Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974) held that state trade-secret law is not preempted by federal patent law even if
the trade secret could have been patented. Id. at 491-93.
152. See generally King v. Pacific Vitamin Corp., 256 Cal. App. 2d 841, 847-49, 64 Cal. Rptr.
486, 489-90 (1967).
153. See California Francisco Inv. Corp. v. Vrionis, 14 Cal. App. 3d 318,322-23,92 Cal. Rptr.
201, 204-05 (1971).
PacXc Law Journal / Vol 13
ing. '" 1 54
Third, the appropriation must be wrongful. In general, wrongful ap-
propriation means a breach of an express or implied contract not to use
or disclose a trade secret, or breach of a trust or a personal confi-
dence. 155 Disclosure is actionable if made by one with a duty not to
disclose, for example, an employee. 156 Non-disclosure is actionable if
there is a fiduciary duty to disclose.'5 7 Use of a trade secret is actiona-
ble where a secret was wrongfully obtained, for instance, by theft, wire-
tapping or aerial photography.1
51
A Accrual of Cause ofAction
In California, a trade secret is not in the nature of property (so that
each new wrongful appropriation would be a new wrong thereby ex-
tending the statute of limitations as a continuing tort); rather, it is an
aspect of a confidential or contractual relationship.'5 9 Therefore, this
cause of action accrues at thefirst adverse use of the trade secret be-
cause that is the point at which the relationship is breached.'
60
Defenses to misappropriation of trade secrets include consent,
waiver, secret developed by employee and accidental disclosure.
14. Negligence
Negligence is defined at common law as the breach of a duty owed to
the plaintiff which is the cause in fact and proximate cause of plaintiff's
actual injury.' 6 ' The tort of negligence, of course, is not primarily ap-
plicable to competitive business situations. The major appeal to busi-
ness law litigators of negligence may be its use in the products liability
area, where a cause of action in negligence allows an appeal to the
jury's moral sensibilities due to the element of breach of a duty.
A key litigation consideration in negligence actions is the allocation
of loss between multiple defendants under the doctrines of contribution
154. 42 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 661 (1974).
155. See generally Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292,299-300,2 Cal. Rptr. 919, 924 (1960).
See also Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 535 P.2d 1161, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1975).
156. 178 Cal. App. 2d 300, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 924 (1960).
157. See Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 347, 411 P.2d 921, 935-36, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 825, 839-40 (1965).
158. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 n.5 (1974).
159. Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 293
(9th Cir. 1969). See also Thompson v. California Brewing Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 469,473-76, 310
P.2d 436, 438-40 (1957).
160. See King v. Pacifica Vitamin Corp., 256 Cal. App. 2d 841, 844-45, 64 Cal. Rptr. 486, 487
(1967).
161. See generally 46 CAL. JuR., Negligence §§1 (definition of negligence), 2 (active or passive
negligence), 3 (statutory basis of liability) (3d ed. 1980).
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and indemnity. 162 In brief, contribution is the right of a judgment
debtor who has paid more than his proportionate share of the judgment
to recover from a joint tortfeasor judgment debtor the latter's propor-
tionate share of the judgment.163 Contribution is based only on the
number of judgment debtors not on the relative fault of the defend-
ants. 164 A right to contribution ripens only after a joint judgment has
been rendered.1 65 The procedure requires that the party seeking con-
tribution file a noticed motion for a judgment of contribution, together
with an affidavit regarding available assets of the other defendants.166
Indemnity, on the other hand, is a loss-shifting device based on rela-
tive fault.
Indemnity may be defined as the obligation resting on one party to
make good a loss or damage another party has incurred.... This
obligation may be expressly provided for by contract. .. , it may be
implied from a contract not specifically mentioning indemnity, or it
may arise from the equities of particular circumstances .... 167
The key to the law of equitable indemnity is that the liability should
be shifted from a passively negligent defendant to an actively negligent
defendant. 168 Traditional equitable indemnity was total and resulted
in a complete transfer of liability.169 However, shortly after California
adopted the comparative negligence rule 7 ' apportioning relative fault
as between plaintiffs and defendants, the rule of comparative fault was
applied between defendants to allow partial equitable indemnity. 17
Thus, under the current law, a defendant may cross-complain against
any person, whether or not currently a defendant, to obtain total or
partial indemnity. 72 This allows compulsory joinder of, and indem-
nity from, negligent nonparties whom the plaintiff may have elected
not to sue for tactical reasons, such as not joining an individual in order
to focus on a corporate defendant. It must be noted, however, that par-
tial indemnity is not available until after the party seeking indemnifica-
162. Contribution is not available for intentional torts. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §875(d). In-
demnity is restricted to negligence actions because it is based on the comparative degrees and
amounts of negligence of the defendants.
163. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§875-880 (releases from and contribution among joint tort-
feasors).
164. Id §876.
165. Id §875(a).
166. Id §878.
167. Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628 537 P.2d 97, 100, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 449, 452 (1975).
168. See id at 629, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
169. See Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 168, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1975).
170. Li v. Yellow Cab. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
171. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 599, 578 P.2d 899,
907, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 190, 195 (1978).
172. Id at 607, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
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tion has paid its share of the judgment.'73
Defense counsel should not overlook the effect of good faith settle-
ments. A tortfeasor who settles in good faith is immune from contribu-
tion and indemnity.174 The settling defendant, however, can pursue
indemnity and contribution from nonsettling tortfeasors, whether or
not named as defendants.
One California appellate judge recently suggested that punitive dam-
ages are now awardable in all negligence actions because legal malice
includes "'an intention to perform an act that the actor . . . should
know. . . will very probably cause harm,'" and "the essence of action-
able negligence [is] that the risk of danger to the plaintiff 'would have
been foreseen ...by a reasonable person .
15. Negligent Misrepresentation
In California, the rapidly evolving tort of negligent misrepresenta-
tion is a form of fraud or deceit. 17 6 Six elements are required for the
prima facie case on liability.
First, the defendant must make an actual, not merely an implied,
false representation.17 7 Second, the false representation must be made
for business purposes in the course of a business or profession. 78
Therefore, the scope of liability is restricted to those persons to whom
the representation was actually made in the course of a business or pro-
fession. Third, that the false representation is made without reasonable
grounds for believing it to be true. Fourth, the false representation
must be made with the intent of inducing reliance. 79 Fifth, the plain-
tiff has to justifiably rely.18 0 Finally, the sixth element requires that
there be proximately caused damage.' 1
In a widely cited'82 example of a complaint stating a cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation, plaintiff successfully alleged that the
Hearst Corporation, publisher of Good Housekeeping Magazine, com-
173. See generally Adams v. Cerritor Trucking Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 957, 145 Cal. Rptr. 310
(1978).
174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §877.6(c).
175. Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 761, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 249-50
(1980) (Elkington, J., concurring opinion) (quoting, in part, 4B WiTKiN, SUMMARY OF CALIFOR-
NIA LAW §496 (8th ed. 1974)).
176. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §1710(2).
177. Huber, Hunt & Nichols v. Moore, 67 Cal. App. 3d 278, 304, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603, 619
(1977).
178. See Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 128, 331 P.2d 742,
749 (1958).
179. CAL. CIV. CODE §1710.
180. Hale v. George A. Hormel & Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 73, 86, 121 Cal. Rptr. 144, 152 (1975).
181. Id
182. See Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969). Seegener-
ally 48 Cal. App. 3d at 85, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
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mitted the tort of negligent misrepresentation when it issued a Good
Housekeeping Seal without carefully examining a product which
caused injury.18 3
16. Nuisance
The common law tort of nuisance is now defined in California by
Civil Code Section 3479, which provides that:
Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to inter-
fere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public
park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.' 84
The basic remedies for nuisance include injunction and damages.'8 5
Nuisance is not of course a classic "business tort" since both busi-
nesses and individuals may be either the perpetrator or the victim of
the nuisance. However, business counsel must be aware of the statu-
tory nuisances 18 6 which apply to their particular type of business as
well as the general nuisances such as obstruction, encroachment and
pollution, including noise pollution.
8 7
A public nuisance is defined in California Civil Code Section 3480 as
"one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighbor-
hood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of
the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be une-
qual." 's One significance of the difference between private and public
nuisances is that there is no statute of limitations on a public nui-
sance. 1
89
17 Plagiarism (Copyright Infringement)
In general, the common law protects a copyright before general pub-
lication, and compliance with the Federal Copyright Law, ' 90 protects it
thereafter. The California common law action for copying a protect-
able literary property has been preempted by the Federal Copyright
Revision Act of 1976, which created a new federal common law copy-
183. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 682-83, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
184. CAL. CIv. CODE §3479.
185. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §731.
186. See California Government Code Section 815, providing that a public entity is not liable
for an injury except as otherwise provided by statute, is not applicable to statutory nuisances.
Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 937 n.13, 496 P.2d 480, 491 n.13, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568,
579 n.13 (1972).
187. Seegeneral, 6 CaL 3d at 936 n.13, 496 P.2d at 491 n.13, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 579 n.13.
188. CAL. Cwy. CODE §3480.
189. Id. §3490.
190. 17 U.S.C. §§l et. seq. (1976).
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right. 191 Therefore, federal law now controls the area of copyrights.
In the related area of reproduction of fine art, if an artist transfers a
work of fine art to another on or after January 1, 1976, the right of
reproduction is reserved to the artist unless the reproduction right is
specifically transferred along with the fine art, or unless the transfer of
the fine art is pursuant to an employment relationship. 192
18. Products Liability
Products liability is, of course, not a tort in itself but rather a generic
term covering four distinct theories of recovery, only two of which
sound in tort. The other two are contractual in nature. One injured in
using a product may sue in contract on the basis of an express contrac-
tual warranty where an untrue statement of fact about the quality of
the product was made. Other possible contractual actions are based on
implied warranties of merchantability 193 and fitness for a particular
purpose.
194
Negligence is another theory of recovery for injuries caused by a de-
fective product. Special litigation considerations in negligence include
the greater opportunity to appeal to the jury's sense of moral outrage
and emotions because negligence involves a showing of moral culpabil-
ity, as contrasted with a strict products liability action which does not
necessarily involve culpability. However, assumption of risk, compara-
tive negligence, and due care are defenses to negligence which are not
available in strict products liability.
The dominant theory of recovery in products liability actions is strict
liability in tort for a defective product. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc. 19- outlines the three elements of a prima facie case in strict
liability, which are (1) the defendant made the product, (2) the product
was defective when it left the defendant's control, and (3) proximately
caused damages. 196
There are four kinds of product "defects": manufacture, design,
packaging and warning. A design defect will be found either if:
The plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or rea-
sonably foreseeable manner, or
The plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused in-
191. Id §§301-302 (1976).
192. CAL. CIV. CODE §982(c).
193. CAL. C M. CODE §2314.
194. Id §2315.
195. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
196. See id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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jury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors,
that on balance the benefits of the 'challenged design outweigh the
rule of danger inherent in such design.
197
Under the case of Cronin v. JB.E. Olson Corp. ,98 a product need not
be "unreasonably dangerous" to trigger strict liability in tort: Only a
"defect" is required.
Misuse of the product in an unforeseeable way is a defense to strict
liability because the resulting injury is outside the scope of risk. 199 Mis-
use of the product in a foreseeable way is not a defense to strict liability
because the resulting injury would be within the scope of risk.
19. Slander of Title
Slander of title is defined as the (1) oral or written; (2) intentional; (3)
false disparagement of the; (4) title to real or personal property; (5)
causing; (6) actual pecuniary damage.2°
It is not necessary to show that any specific business deal was im-
paired. The recoverable damages consist of the general impairment of
vendability plus costs of litigation or other process necessary to remove
doubt cast on title.2° '
Examples of slander of title include the recordation of an abstract of
judgment despite a stay of execution, the placing of a sign on a neigh-
bor's house falsely announcing a cloud on the title,2°2 the false an-
nouncement by a lessor to a buyer of a lease from the lessee that the
lease is invalid,2°3 and the filing of a master plan by a developer which
falsely implied the right to use plaintiff neighbor's property.2°4
20. Trade Libel (Injurious Falsehood or Disparagement)
The case of Erlich v. Etner,2 °5 stated the six necessary elements for
trade libel, which are (1) intentional; (2) disparagement (untrue state-
ment of fact); (3) of the quality; (4) of property; (5) causing; (6) specific
pecuniary damage.20 6
The key difference between libel and trade libel is that the essence of
197. Barker v. Lull Eng. Co. Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413,426-27,573 P.2d 443,452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
234 (1978).
198. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
199. Id at 123, 501 P.2d at 1155, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
200. See Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d 412, 419, 89 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518-19 (1970)
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §624 (1938)).
201. Id at 423-24, 436-39, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 521-22, 531-33.
202. Phillips v. Glazer, 94 Cal. App. 2d 673, 674, 211 P.2d 37, 38 (1949).
203. Baker v. Kale, 83 Cal. App. 2d 89, 91, 189 P.2d 57, 59 (1948).
204. Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp., 12 Cal. App. 3d 412, 417-19, 89 Cal. Rptr. 514, 517-19 (1970).
205. 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1964).
206. Id at 73, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
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libel is nonmonetary damage to the reputation of an individual,
whereas specific money damage to a business is required for trade libel.
It is insufficient to show a general decline in business. The plaintiff
must identify particular purchasers who refrained from dealing with
the plaintiff.2"7
The defenses of privilege are generally the same for both libel and
trade libel.2"8 However, truth is not actually a "defense" to trade libel
because untruth is an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
21. Trademark Infringement
In California, this tort sounds in common law unfair competition.20 9
Statutory proscription of trademark infringement is contained in sec-
tions 14320 through 14324 of the California Business and Professions
Code.
22. Tradename Infringement
In California, this tort also sounds in common law unfair competi-
tion.2 10 Business and Professions Code Sections 14330, 14340 and
14402 contain the statutory framework for suits for tradename infringe-
ment.
23. Unfair Competition
In California, common law unfair competition is an umbrella for a
variety of arguably separate torts such as trademark and tradename
infringement, "palming off," "passing off," and "imitation of product."
The modem trend in both the statutes and the common law is to
expand the scope of liability for unfair competition, imposing "increas-
ingly higher standards of fairness or commercial morality in trade." ''
a. Prima Facie Case Elements
Three elements are required for the prima facie case of common law
unfair competition. First, there must be the imitation of an appearance
or name. Fraudulent intent need not be shown.21 2
Second, the plaintiff must be known to the public by such name, de-
sign or appearance. This element is qualified by the "secondary mean-
207. Id at 73-74, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
208. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §47.
209. See text accompanying notes 210-224 infra.
210. See text accompanying notes 210-224 infra.
211. Ball v. American Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 14 Cal. App. 3d 289,301-02, 92 Cal. Rptr. 228, 236
(1971).
212. See id at 303-304, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
1981 / Business Torts
ing" doctrine. That doctrine provides that if a geographical, generic or
descriptive word acquires, in the mind of a substantial number of pro-
spective purchasers, a second meaning as referring to aparticular per-
son or association, use of that name may be enjoined.z13 Generic or
common descriptive terms are not protectable unless they have ac-
quired a secondary meaning.2 14 The plaintiff need not have been re-
sponsible for the development of the secondary meaning. 15 In the area
of trademarks and tradenames, "inherently distinctive marks ( e., fan-
ciful, arbitrary or suggestive) are protectable. . without. . . a secon-
dary meaning. ' ' 16
The third element in the prima facie case for common law unfair
competition is the likelihood of deceiving or confusing the buying pub-
lic. 217 Actual deception of pirticular persons need not be shown." 8
b. Statutory Unfair Competition
In sections 17200 through 17208 of the California'Business and Pro-
fessions Code, statutory liability for unfair competition and false adver-
tising has recently been expanded, and new procedures added.219
Statutory unfair competition includes (1) unlawful, unfair or fraudu-
lent business practices;220 (2) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading
advertising;22 ' and (3) false advertising. 2  The plaintiff should there-
fore consider alleging both common law and statutory unfair competi-
tion. Also, general and punitive damages may be recoverable for
statutory unfair competition, in contrast to the equitable relief limita-
tion at common law.22
3
Is a statutory unfair competition action triable before a jury if dam-
ages are prayed for? Probably not. Statutory unfair competition
sounds in equity as does the common law action.2 4 Although Section
17203 of the Business and Professions Code gives the judge the general
213. See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 688,
104 P.2d 650, 652 (1940); 14 Cal. App. 3d at 302, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
214. North Carolina Dairy Foundation, Inc. v. Foremost-McKesson, 92 Cal. App. 3d 98, 106-
07, 154 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798-99 (1979) (trademark); 14 Cal. App. 3d at 302, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 236
(trade name).
215. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Friedman, 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 135, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94, 98
,(1977).
216. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 106, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 798-99.
217. See 68 Cal. App. 3d 127, 136, 137 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99 (1977).
218. 14 Cal. App. 3d at 310, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
219. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§17200-17208.
220. Id §17200.
221. Id
222. Id §§17200, 17500.
223. See United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 334, 345, 120
Cal. Rptr. 904, 911 (1975); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§17203, 17535.
224. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §17203.
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equitable power to award damages to restore the aggrieved party to the
status quo, the author has found no case that held or stated that a dam-
ages action under that section is thereby transformed from an equitable
action into an action which is triable before a jury.
Statutory proscription of infringement remedies under tradename,
and servicemark, supplementing remedies under common law unfair
competition, can be found at Sections 14320 through 14342 and 14402
of the Business and Professions Code.225
225. Id. §§14320-14342, 14402.
